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Abstract. Neural networks have led to major improvements in image
classification but suffer from being non-robust to adversarial changes,
unreliable uncertainty estimates on out-distribution samples and their
inscrutable black-box decisions. In this work we propose RATIO, a train-
ing procedure for Robustness via Adversarial Training on In- and Out-
distribution, which leads to robust models with reliable and robust con-
fidence estimates on the out-distribution. RATIO has similar generative
properties to adversarial training so that visual counterfactuals produce
class specific features. While adversarial training comes at the price of
lower clean accuracy, RATIO achieves state-of-the-art l2-adversarial ro-
bustness on CIFAR10 and maintains better clean accuracy.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have shown phenomenal success in achieving high accu-
racy on challenging classification tasks [35]. However, they are lacking in terms
of robustness against adversarial attacks [62], make overconfident predictions
[23,25] especially on out-of-distribution (OOD) data [49,28] and their black box
decisions are inscrutable [67]. Progress has been made with respect to all these
aspects but there is currently no approach which is accurate, robust, has good
confidence estimates and is explainable. Adversarial training (AT) [41] leads
to models robust against adversarial attacks in a defined threat model and has
recently been shown to produce classifiers with generative capabilities [57]. How-
ever, AT typically suffers from a significant drop in accuracy and is over-confident
on OOD data as we show in this paper. Adversarial confidence enhanced training
(ACET) [25] enforces low confidence in a neighborhood around OOD samples
and can be seen as adversarial training on the out-distribution. ACET leads to
models with good OOD detection performance even in an adversarial setting and
suffers from a smaller loss in clean accuracy compared to AT. However, ACET
models typically are significantly less robust than adversarially trained models.
In this paper we show that combining AT and ACET into RATIO, Robust-
ness via Adversarial Training on In- and Out-distribution, inherits the good
properties of adversarial training and ACET without, or at least with signif-
icantly reduced, negative effects, e.g. we get SOTA l2-robustness on CIFAR10
and have better clean accuracy than AT. On top of this we get reliable confidence
estimates on the out-distribution even in a worst case scenario. In particular AT
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Table 1: Summary: We show clean and robust accuracy in an l2-threat model
with  = 0.5 and the expected calibration error (ECE). For OOD detection we
report the mean of clean and worst case AUC over several out-distributions in an
l2-threat model with  = 1.0 as well as the mean maximal confidence (MMC) on
the out-distributions. In light red we highlight failure cases for certain metrics.
Only RATIO-0.25 (R0.25) has good performance across all metrics.
CIFAR10 Plain OE ACET M0.5 AT0.5 AT0.25 JEM-0 R0.5 R0.25
Acc. ↑ 96.2 96.4 94.1 90.8 90.8 94.0 92.8 91.1 93.5
R. Acc.0.5 ↑ 0.0 0.0 52.3 69.3 70.4 65.0 40.5 73.3 70.5
ECE (in %) ↓ 1.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.2 3.9 2.8 2.7
AUC ↑ 94.2 96.5 94.7 81.8 88.9 92.7 75.0 95.6 95.0
WC AUC1.0 ↑ 1.6 8.7 81.9 48.5 57.4 42.0 14.6 83.6 84.3
MMC ↓ 62.0 31.9 39.1 62.7 55.8 55.2 69.7 31.9 33.9
SVHN Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
Acc. ↑ 97.3 97.6 97.8 94.4 96.7 94.3 96.8
R. Acc.0.5 ↑ 0.9 0.3 28.8 68.1 63.0 68.4 64.8
ECE ↓ 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.6 0.8 2.0 1.8
AUC ↑ 96.9 99.6 99.8 91.0 97.0 99.8 99.9
WC AUC1.0 ↑ 8.5 18.2 96.0 51.1 48.3 97.5 97.5
MMC ↓ 61.5 16.3 11.8 67.1 49.1 12.1 11.1
yields highly overconfident predictions on out-distribution images in the absence
of class specific features whereas RATIO only yields high confident predictions
if recognizable features are present. In summary, RATIO achieves high clean ac-
curacy, is robust, calibrated and has generative properties which can be used to
produce high-quality visual counterfactual explanations: see Table 1 for a sum-
mary of our results for CIFAR10 and SVHN and Table 2 for CIFAR100 and
restricted ImageNet [65].
2 Related Work
Adversarial Robustness. Adversarial attacks are small changes of an image
with respect to some distance measure, which change the decision of a classifier
[62]. Many defenses have been proposed but with more powerful or adapted at-
tacks most of them could be defeated [14,8,3,46]. Adversarial training (AT) [41]
is the most widely used approach that has not been broken. However, adversarial
robustness comes at the price of a drop in accuracy [59,61]. Recent variations are
using other losses [72] and boost robustness via generation of additional training
data [10,1] or pre-training [30]. Another line of work are provable defenses, either
deterministic [69,13,45,20] or based on randomized smoothing [40,36,12]. How-
ever, provable defenses are still not competitive with the empirical robustness
of adversarial training for datasets like CIFAR10 and have even worse accuracy.
We show that using AT on the in-distribution and out-distribution leads to a
smaller drop in clean accuracy and similar or better robustness.
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Confidence on In- and Out-distribution. Neural networks have been shown
to yield overly confident predictions far away from the training data [49,28,39]
and this is even provably the case for ReLU networks [25]. Moreover, large neu-
ral networks are not calibrated on the in-distribution and have a bias to be
overconfident [23]. The overconfidence on the out-distribution has been tackled
in [37,25,29] by enforcing low-confidence predictions on a large out-distribution
dataset e.g. using the 80 million tiny images dataset[29] leads to state-of-the-
art results. However, if one maximizes the confidence in a ball around out-
distribution-samples, most OOD methods are again overconfident [59,25,60,43]
and only AT on the out-distribution as in ACET [25] or methods providing guar-
anteed worst case OOD performance [43,7] work in this worst-case setting. We
show that RATIO leads to better worst case OOD performance than ACET.
Counterfactual Explanations. Counterfactual explanations have been pro-
posed in [67] as a tool for making classifier decisions plausible, since humans
also justify decisions via counterfactuals “I would have decided for X, if Y had
been true” [44]. Other forms are explanations based on image features [26,27].
However, changing the decision for image classification in image space for non-
robust models leads to adversarial samples [18] with changes that are visually
not meaningful. Thus visual counterfactuals are often based on generative mod-
els or restrictions on the space of image manipulation [56,51,11,21,73,68]. Robust
models wrt l2-adversarial attacks [65,57] have been shown to change their de-
cision when class-specific features appear in the image, which is a prerequisite
for meaningful counterfactuals [6]. RATIO generates better counterfactuals, i.e.
the confidence of the counterfactual images obtained by an l2-adversarial attack
tends to be high only after features of the alternative class have appeared. Es-
pecially for out-distribution images the difference to AT is pronounced.
Robust, reliable and explainable classifiers. This is the holy grail of ma-
chine learning. A model which is accurate and calibrated [23] on the in-distribution,
reliably has low confidence on out-distribution inputs, is robust to adversarial
manipulation and has explainable decisions. Up to our knowledge there is no
model which claims to have all these properties. The closest one we are aware of is
the JEM-0 of [22] which is supposed to be robust, detects out-of-distribution sam-
ples and has generative properties. They state “JEM does not confidently classify
nonsensical images, so instead, ... natural image properties visibly emerge”. We
show that RATIO gets us closer to this ultimate goal and outperforms JEM-0 in
all aspects: accuracy, robustness, (worst-case) out-of-distribution detection, and
visual counterfactual explanations.
3 RATIO: Robust, Reliable and Explainable Classifier
In the following we are considering multi-class (image) classification. We have
the logits of a classifier f : [0, 1]d → RK where d is the input dimension and
K the number of classes. With ∆ = {p ∈ [0, 1]K | ∑Ki=1 pi = 1} we denote the
predicted probability distribution of f over the labels by pˆ : Rd → ∆ which
is obtained using the softmax function: pˆf,s(x) =
efs(x)∑K
j=1 e
fj(x)
, s = 1, . . . ,K. We
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further denote the training set by (xi, yi)
N
i=1 with xi ∈ [0, 1]d and yi ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
As loss we always use the cross-entropy loss defined as
L(p, pˆf ) =
K∑
j=1
pj log(pˆf,j), (1)
where p ∈ ∆ is the true distribution and pˆf the predicted distribution.
3.1 Robustness via Adversarial Training
An adversarial sample of x with respect to some threat model T (x) ⊂ Rd is a
point z ∈ T (x) ∩ [0, 1]d such that the decision of the classifier f changes for z
while an oracle would unambiguously associate z with the class of x. In particular
this implies that z shows no meaningful class-associated features of any other
class. Formally, let y be the correct label of x, then z is an adversarial sample if
arg max
k 6=y
fk(z) > fy(x), z ∈ [0, 1]d ∩ T (x), (2)
assuming that the threat model is small enough such that no real class change
occurs. Typical threat models are lp-balls of a given radius , that is
T (x) = Bp(x, ) = {z ∈ Rd | ‖z − x‖p ≤ }. (3)
The robust test accuracy is then defined as the lowest possible accuracy when
every test image x is allowed to be changed to some z ∈ T (x) ∩ [0, 1]d. Plain
models have a robust test accuracy close to zero, even for “small” threat models.
Several strategies for adversarial robustness have been proposed, but adver-
sarial training (AT) [41] has proven to produce robust classifiers across datasets
and network architectures without adding significant computational overhead
during inference (compared to randomized smoothing [40,36,12]).
The objective of adversarial training for a threat model T (x) ⊂ Rd is:
min
f
E(x,y)∼pin
[
max
z∈T (x)
L(ey, pˆf (z))
]
, (4)
where ey is a one-hot encoding of label y and pin(x, y) is the training distribution.
During training one approximately solves the inner maximization problem in
equation 4 via projected gradient descent (PGD) and then computes the gradient
wrt f at the approximate solution of the inner problem. The community has put
emphasis on robustness wrt l∞ but recently there is more interest in other threat
models e.g. l2-balls [64,54,57]. In particular, it has been noted [65,57] that robust
models wrt an l2-ball have the property that “adversarial” samples generated
within a sufficiently large l2-ball tend to have image features of the predicted
class. Thus they are not “adversarial” samples in the sense defined above as the
true class has changed or is at least ambiguous.
The main problem of AT is that robust classifiers suffer from a significant
drop in accuracy compared to normal training [65]. This trade-off [58,61] can be
mitigated e.g. via training 50% on clean samples and 50% on adversarial samples
at the price of reduced robustness [61] or via semi-supervised learning [66,47,10].
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3.2 Worst-case OOD detection via Adversarial Training on the
Out-distribution
While adversarial training yields robust classifiers, similarly to plain models it
suffers from overconfident predictions on out-of-distribution samples. Overconfi-
dent predictions are a problem for safety-critical systems as the classifier is not
reliably flagging when it operates “out of its specification” and thus its confi-
dence in the prediction cannot be used to trigger human intervention.
In order to mitigate over-confident predictions [25,29] proposed to enforce
low confidence on images from a chosen out-distribution pout(x). A generic out-
distribution would be all natural images and thus [29] suggest the 80 million
tiny images dataset [63] as a proxy for this. While [29] consistently reduce con-
fidence on different out-of-distribution datasets, similar to plain training for the
in distribution one can again get overconfident predictions by maximizing the
confidence in a small ball around a given out-distribution image (adversarial
attacks on the out-distribution [25,43]).
Thus [25] proposed Adversarial Confidence Enhanced Training (ACET) which
enforces low confidence in an entire neighborhood around the out-distribution
samples which can be seen as a form of AT on the out-distribution:
min
f
E(x,y)∼pin
[
L(ey, pˆf (x))
]
+ λE(x,y)∼pout
[
max
‖z−x‖2≤
L(1/K, pˆf (z))
]
, (5)
where 1 is the vector of all ones (outlier exposure [29] has the same objective
without the inner maximization for the out-distribution). Different from [25] we
use the same loss for in-and out-distribution, whereas they used the maximal
log-confidence over all classes as loss for the out-distribution. In our experience
the maximal log-confidence is more difficult to optimize, but both losses are
minimized by the uniform distribution over the labels. Thus the difference is
rather small and we also denote this version as ACET.
3.3 RATIO: Robustness via Adversarial Training on In-and
Out-distribution
We propose RATIO: adversarial training on in-and out-distribution. This combi-
nation leads to synergy effects where most positive attributes of AT and ACET
are fused without having larger drawbacks. The objective of RATIO is given by:
min
f
E(x,y)∼pin
[
max
‖z−x‖2≤i
L(ey, pˆf (z))
]
+λE(x,y)∼pout
[
max
‖z−x‖2≤o
L(1/K, pˆf (z))
]
,
(6)
where λ has the interpretation of popi , the probability to see out-distribution po
and in-distribution pi samples at test time. Here we have specified an l2-threat
model for in-and out-distribution but the objective can be adapted to different
threat models which could be different for in- and out-distribution. The surpris-
ing part of RATIO is that the addition of the out-distribution part can improve
the results even on the in-distribution in terms of (robust) accuracy. The reason
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is that adversarial training on the out-distribution ensures that spurious features
do not change the confidence of the classifier. This behavior generalizes to the
in-distribution and thus ACET (adversarial training on the out-distribution) is
also robust on the in-distribution (52.3% robust accuracy for l2 with  = 0.5 on
CIFAR10). One problem of adversarial training is overfitting on the training set
[53]. Our RATIO has seen more images at training time and while the direct
goal is distinct (keeping one-hot prediction on the in-distribution and uniform
prediction on out-distribution) both aim at constant behavior of the classifier
over the l2-ball and thus the effectively increased training size improves gener-
alization (in contrast to AT, RATIO has its peak robustness at the end of the
training). Moreover, RATIO typically only shows high confidence if class-specific
features have appeared which we use in the generative process described next.
4 Visual Counterfactual Explanations
The idea of a counterfactual explanation [67] is to provide the smallest change
of a given input such that the decision changes into a desired target class e.g.
how would this X-ray image need to look in order to change the diagnosis from
X to Y. Compared to sensitivity based explanations [5,71] or explanations based
on feature attributions [4] counterfactual explanations have the advantage that
they have an “operational meaning” which couples the explanation directly to
the decision of the classifier. On the other hand the counterfactual explanation
requires us to specify a metric or a budget for the allowed change of the image
which can be done directly in image space or in the latent space of a generative
model. However, our goal is that the classifier directly learns what meaningful
changes are and we do not want to impose that via a generative model. Thus we
aim at visual counterfactual explanations directly in image space with a fixed
budget for changing the image. As the decision changes, features of this class
should appear in the image (see Figure 2). Normally trained models will not
achieve this since non-robust models change their prediction for non-perceptible
perturbations [62], see Figure 1. Thus robustness against (l2-)adversarial pertur-
bations is a necessary requirement for visual counterfactuals and indeed [65,57]
have shown “generative properties” of l2-robust models.
A visual counterfactual for the original point x classified as c = arg max
k=1,...,K
fk(x),
a target class t ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and a budget  is defined as
x(t) = arg max
z∈[0,1]d, ‖x−z‖2≤
pˆf,t(z), (7)
where pˆf,t(z) is the confidence for class t of our classifier for the image z. If t 6= c
it answers the counterfactual question of how to use the given budget to change
the original input x so that the classifier is most confident in class t. Note that
in our definition we include the case where t = c, that is we ask how to change
the input x classified as c to get even more confident in class c. In Figure 2 we
illustrate both directions and show how for robust models class specific image
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Table 2: Summary for CIFAR100 and R. ImageNet (see Table 1 for details).
CIFAR100 Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
Acc. ↑ 81.5 81.4 - 70.6 75.8 69.2 74.4
R. Acc.0.5 ↑ 0.0 0.0 - 43.2 37.3 45.6 42.4
ECE ↓ 1.2 7.2 - 1.3 1.5 3.2 2.0
AUC ↑ 84.0 91.9 - 75.6 79.4 87.0 86.9
WC AUC1.0 ↑ 0.4 14.6 - 29.9 24.8 55.5 54.5
MMC ↓ 51.1 21.8 - 45.8 47.1 24.4 31.0
R.Imagenet Plain OE ACET M3.5 AT3.5 AT1.75 R3.5 R1.75
Acc. ↑ 96.6 97.2 96.2 90.3 93.5 95.5 93.9 95.5
R. Acc.3.5 ↑ 0.0 0.0 6.2 47.7 47.7 36.7 49.2 43.0
ECE ↓ 0.6 1.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.7
AUC ↑ 92.7 98.9 97.74 83.6 84.3 86.5 97.2 97.8
WC AUC7.0 ↑ 0.0 1.8 87.54 44.2 37.5 16.3 90.9 90.6
MMC ↓ 67.9 20.6 34.85 69.2 75.2 81.8 33.6 32.3
features appear when optimizing the confidence of that class. This shows that
the optimization of visual counterfactuals can be done directly in image space.
Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
P
la
in
ship: 0.36
car: 0.63
ship: 1.00
car: 0.00
ship: 1.00
car: 0.00
ship: 1.00
car: 0.00
ship: 1.00
car: 0.00
ship: 1.00
car: 0.00
ship: 1.00
car: 0.00
ship: 0.00
car: 1.00
ship: 0.00
car: 1.00
ship: 0.00
car: 1.00
ship: 0.00
car: 1.00
ship: 0.00
car: 1.00
ship: 0.00
car: 1.00
Fig. 1: Failure of a visual counterfactual for a plain model. The targeted attack
immediately produces very high confidence in both classes but instead of class
features only high-frequency noise appears because plain models are not robust.
5 Experiments
Comparison, Training and Attacks. We validate our approach on SVHN
[48], CIFAR10/100 [34] and restricted ImageNet [57]. On CIFAR10 we compare
RATIO to a pretrained JEM-0 [22] and the AT model [19] with l2 = 0.5 (M0.5)
(both not available on the other datasets). As an ablation study of RATIO we
train a plain model, outlier exposure (OE) [29], ACET [25] and AT with l2 = 0.5
8 M. Augustin, A. Meinke, M. Hein
(AT0.5) and l2 = 0.25 (AT0.25), using the same hyperparameters as for our RA-
TIO training. On SVHN we use a ResNet18 architecture for all methods and on
the other datasets we use ResNet50, both with standard input normalization.
For ACET on CIFAR10 we use ResNet18 since for ResNet50 we could not obtain
a model with good worst case OOD performance as the attack seemed to fail at
some point during training (on CIFAR100 this was even the case for ResNet18
and thus we omit it from comparison). In general ACET is difficult to train. For
RATIO the additional adversarial training on the in-distribution seems to stabi-
lize the training and we did not encounter any problems. As out-distribution for
SVHN and CIFAR we use 80 million tiny images [63] as suggested in [29] and
for restricted ImageNet the remaining ImageNet classes. For the out-distribution
we always use l2-attacks with radius o = 1 for SVHN/CIFAR and o = 7 on
restricted ImageNet (both ACET and RATIO) whereas on the in-distribution we
use i = 0.25 and i = 0.5 and i = 1.75 and i = 3.5, respectively (both AT and
RATIO). Therefore RATIO/AT models are labeled by i. For further training
details see the Appendix. For the adversarial attacks on in- and out-distribution
we use the recent Auto-Attack [14] which is an ensemble of four attacks, includ-
ing the black-box Square Attack [2] and three white-box attacks (FAB-attack
[15] and AUTO-PGD with different losses). For each of the white-box attacks,
a budget of 100 iterations and 5 restarts is used and a query limit of 5000 for
Square attack. In [14] they show that Auto-Attack consistently improves the
robustness evaluation for a large number of models (including JEM-x).
Calibration on the in-distribution. With RATIO we aim for reliable con-
fidence estimates, in particular no overconfident predictions. In order to have
comparable confidences for the different models we train, especially when we
check visual counterfactuals or feature generation, we first need to “align” their
confidences. We do this by minimizing the expected calibration error (ECE) via
temperature rescaling [23]. Note that this rescaling does not change the classifi-
cation and thus has no impact on (robust) accuracy and only a minor influence
on the (worst case) AUC values for OOD-detection. For details see the Appendix.
(Robust) Accuracy on the in-distribution. Using Auto-Attack [14] we eval-
uate robustness on the full test set for both CIFAR and r. Imagenet and 10000
test samples for SVHN. Tables 1 and 2 contain (robust l2) accuracy, detailed re-
sults, including l∞ attacks, can be found in the Appendix. On CIFAR10, RATIO
achieves significantly higher robust accuracy than AT for l2-and l∞-attacks. Thus
the additional adversarial training on the out-distribution with radius o = 1
boosts the robustness on the in-distribution. In particular, RATIO0.25 achieves
better l2-robustness than AT0.5 and M0.5 at ≈ 2.7% higher clean accuracy. In ad-
dition, R0.5 yields new state-of-the-art l2-robust accuracy at radius 0.5 (see [14]
for a benchmark) while having higher test accuracy than AT0.5, M0.5. Moreover,
the l2-robustness at radius 1.0 and the l∞-robustness at 8/255 is significantly
better. Interestingly, although ACET is not designed to yield adversarial ro-
bustness on the in-distribution, it achieves more than 50% robust accuracy for
l2 = 0.5 and outperforms JEM-0 in all benchmarks. However, as our goal is to
have a model which is both robust and accurate, we recommend to use R0.25 for
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CIFAR10 which has a drop of only 2.6% in test accuracy compared to a plain
model while having similar robustness to M0.5 and AT0.5. Similar observations
as for CIFAR10 hold for CIFAR100 and for Restricted ImageNet, see Table 2,
even though for CIFAR100 AT and RATIO suffer a higher loss in accuracy. On
SVHN, RATIO outperforms AT in terms of robust accuracy trained with the
same l2-radius but the effect is less than for CIFAR10. We believe that this is
due to the fact that that the images obtained from the 80 million tiny image
dataset (out distribution) do not reflect the specific structure of SVHN numbers
which makes (worst case) outlier detection an easier task. This is supported by
the fact that ACET achieves better clean accuracy on SVHN than both OE and
the plain model while it has worse clean accuracy on CIFAR10.
Visual Counterfactual Generation. We use 500 step Auto-PGD [14] for a
targeted attack with the objective in equation 7. However, note that this non-
convex optimization problem has been shown to be NP-hard [31]. In Figure 2, 3
and 4 and in the Appendix we show generated counterfactuals for all datasets.
For CIFAR10 AT0.5 performs very similar to RATIO0.25 in terms of the emer-
gence of class specific image features. In particular, we often see the appearance
of characteristic features such as pointed ears for cats, wheels for cars and trucks,
large eyes for both cats and dogs and the antlers for deers. JEM-0 and ACET
perform worse but for both of them one observes the appearance of image fea-
tures. However, particularly the images of JEM-0 have a lot of artefacts. For
SVHN RATIO0.25 on average performs better than AT0.25 and ACET. It is in-
teresting to note that for both datasets class-specific features emerge already
for an l2-radius of 1.0. Thus it seems questionable if l2-adversarial robustness
beyond a radius of 1.0 should be enforced. Due to the larger number of classes,
CIFAR100 counterfactuals are of slightly lower quality. For Restricted ImageNet
the visual counterfactuals show class-specific features but can often be identified
as synthetic due to misaligned features.
Reliable Detection of (Worst-case) Out-of-Distribution Images. A re-
liable classifier should assign low confidence to OOD images. This is not the
case for plain models and AT. As the 80 million tiny image dataset has been
used for training for ACET and RATIO (respectively other ImageNet classes for
Restricted ImageNet), we evaluate the discrimination of in-distribution versus
out-distribution on other datasets as in [43], see the Appendix for details. We use
maxk pˆf,k(x) as feature to discriminate in-and out-distribution (binary classifi-
cation) and compute the AUC. However, it has been shown that even state-of-
the-art methods like outlier exposure (OE) suffer from overconfident predictions
if one searches for the most confident prediction in a small neighborhood around
the the out-distribution image [43]. Thus we also report the worst-case AUC by
maximizing the confidence in an l2-ball of radius 1.0 (resp. 7.0 for R. ImageNet)
around OOD images via Auto-PGD [14] with 100 steps and 5 random restarts.
Figure 5 further shows that while RATIO behaves similar to AT around sam-
ples from the data distribution, which explains similar counterfactuals, it has a
flatter confidence profile around out-distribution samples.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
dog: 0.00
cat: 0.98
dog: 0.99
cat: 0.00
dog: 0.99
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 0.99
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
J
E
M
-0
dog: 0.04
cat: 0.71
dog: 0.99
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 0.99
dog: 0.00
cat: 0.99
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
dog: 0.05
frog: 0.66
dog: 0.46
frog: 0.03
dog: 0.89
frog: 0.01
dog: 0.99
frog: 0.00
dog: 1.00
frog: 0.00
dog: 1.00
frog: 0.00
dog: 1.00
frog: 0.00
dog: 0.01
frog: 0.89
dog: 0.00
frog: 0.99
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Fig. 2: Visual Counterfactuals (CIFAR10): The dog image on the left is
misclassified by all models (confidence for true and predicted class are shown).
The top row shows visual counterfactuals for the correct class (how to change
the image so that it is classified as dog) and the bottom row shows how to change
the image in order to increase the confidence in the wrong prediction for different
budgets of the l2-radius ( = 0.5 to  = 3). More examples are in the appendix.
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Fig. 3: Visual Counterfactuals (SVHN): The 5 on the left is misclassified by
all models. We show counterfactuals for the true class the predicted class (see
Figure 2). RATIO consistently produces samples with fewer artefacts than AT.
on 1024 points from each out-distribution (300 points for LSUN CR). Using
the worst case confidences of these points we find empirical upper bounds on the
worst-case AUC under our threat model. We report both the average-case AUCs
as well as the worst-case AUCs in the Appendix.The average AUC over all OOD
datasets is reported in Tables 1 and 2. The AT-model of Madry et. al (M0.5)
perform worse than the plain model even on the average case task. However, we
see that with our more aggressive data augmentation this problem is somewhat
alleviated (AT0.5 and AT0.25). As expected ACET, has good worst-case OOD
performance but is similar to the plain model for the average case. JEM-0 has
bad worst-case AUCs and we cannot confirm the claim that “JEM does not
confidently classify nonsensical images”[22]. As expected, OE has state-of-the-
art performance on the clean task but has no robustness on the out-distribution,
so it fails completely in this regime. Our RATIO models show strong performance
on all tasks and even outperform the ACET model which shows that adversarial
robustness wrt the in-distribution also helps with adversarial robustness on the
out-distribution. On SVHN the average case OOD task is simple enough that
several models achieve near perfect AUCs, but again only ACET and our RATIO
models manage to retain strong performance in the worst case setting. The worst-
case AUC of AT models is significantly worse than that of ACET and RATIO.
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Fig. 4: Visual Counterfactuals top: RATIO-0.25 for CIFAR100 and bottom:
RATIO-1.75 for RestrictedImageNet.
Feature Generation on OOD images. Finally, we test the abilities to
generate image features with a targeted attack on OOD images (taken from
80m tiny image dataset resp. ImageNet classes not belonging to R. ImageNet).
The setting is similar to the visual counterfactuals. We take some OOD image
and then optimize the confidence in the class which is predicted on the OOD
image. The results can be found in Figure 7 and 6 and additional samples are
attached in the Appendix. For CIFAR10 all methods are able to generate image
features of the class but the predicted confidences are only reasonable for ACET
and RATIO0.25 whereas AT0.5 and JEM-0 are overconfident when no strong class
features are visible. This observation generalizes to SVHN and mostly CIFAR100
and r. Imagenet, i.e. RATIO generally has the best OOD-confidence profile.
Summary. In summary, in Table 1 and 2 we can see that RATIO0.25 resp.
RATIO1.75 is except for CIFAR100 the only model which has no clear failure
case. Here the subjective definition of a failure case (highlighted in red) is an
entry which is “significantly worse” than the best possible in this metric. Thus we
think that RATIO succeeds in being state-of-the-art in generating a model which
is accurate, robust, has reliable confidence and is able to produce meaningful
visual counterfactuals. Nevertheless RATIO is not perfect and we discuss failure
cases of all models in the Appendix.
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Fig. 5: (a) Mean confidence in true label as a function of the attack l2-radius
around CIFAR10 test images. RATIO and AT0.5 have a reasonable decay of the
confidence. (b) Mean of maximal confidence around OD-data (tiny images) over
the attack l2-radius. All methods except RATIO and ACET are overconfident.
Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
R
-0
.2
5
lizard - 0.43 lizard - 0.95 lizard - 0.98 lizard - 0.99 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00
Model Orig.  = 3.5  = 7.0  = 10.5  = 14.0  = 17.5  = 21.0
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Fig. 6: Feature Generation for out-distribution images top: RATIO-0.25
for CIFAR100 and bottom: RATIO-1.75 for R.ImageNet
6 Conclusion and Outlook
We have shown that adversarial robustness on in-distribution and out-distribution
(as a proxy of all natural images) gets us closer to a classifier which is accurate,
robust, has reliable confidence estimates and is able to produce visual counter-
factual explanations with strong class specific image features. For the usage in
safety-critical in systems it would be ideal if these properties can be achieved in
a provable way which remains an open problem.
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Table 3: ID performance: Evaluation of the classification accuracy and adver-
sarial robustness under various threat models.
CIFAR10 Plain OE ACET M0.5 AT0.5 AT0.25 JEM-0 R0.5 R0.25
Clean 96.15 96.41 94.06 90.83 90.79 94.00 92.84 91.08 93.53
l2 0.5 0.00 0.01 52.66 69.32 70.42 65.02 40.67 73.27 70.49
l2 1.0 0.00 0.00 14.95 36.86 38.20 20.83 6.77 44.09 34.15
l∞ 8/255 0.00 0.00 12.66 29.59 30.58 14.30 7.19 37.71 29.18
SVHN Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
Clean 97.33 97.56 97.77 94.38 96.70 94.30 96.80
l2 0.5 0.85 0.33 28.82 68.58 63.18 68.85 65.02
l2 1.0 0.01 0.00 4.20 26.40 17.19 27.06 20.30
l∞ 8/255 0.00 0.00 4.03 27.56 19.05 28.20 22.14
CIFAR100 Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
Clean 81.49 81.43 - 70.60 75.84 69.17 74.38
l2 0.5 0.00 0.01 - 43.23 37.26 45.55 42.41
l2 1.0 0.00 0.00 - 19.14 9.45 23.87 16.30
l∞ 8/255 0.00 0.00 - 13.74 5.96 18.49 12.39
RImagenet Plain OE ACET M3.5 AT3.5 AT1.75 R3.5 R1.75
Clean 96.55 97.22 96.24 90.25 93.49 95.45 93.94 95.46
l2 3.5 00.00 00.00 6.25 47.66 47.66 36.72 49.22 42.97
l2 7.0 00.00 00.00 0.78 14.06 11.72 2.54 15.43 12.70
l∞ 8/255 00.00 00.00 1.17 11.72 10.55 1.95 17.58 10.55
A Additional Results
A.1 Detailed results on robustness evaluation on the in-distribution
The full adversarial robustness evaluation for all datasets can be found in Table 3.
A.2 Comparison to TRADES on CIFAR10
TRADES [72] has shown competitive performance regarding adversarial robust-
ness and thus we compare to TRADES on CIFAR10. We trained two ResNet50
models with the popular TRADES training scheme [72]. The first one is based
on the official PyTorch implementation with l2 radius 0.5 and uses the same
hyperparameters that were used to train the reference models. As those hyper-
parameters are likely better suited for L∞ training, we further implemented
TRADES training in our framework and trained an additional model with the
same hyperparameters that were used for the AT and RATIO models. While
our own implementation of TRADES is slightly better than standard adversar-
ial training, our RATIO-0.5 model outperforms both TRADES models in terms
of accuracy and robustness .
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Table 4: Evaluation of the CIFAR10 TRADES model.
CIFAR10 Clean l2 0.5 l2 1.0 AUC WC AUC
Reference 86.22 68.81 43.80 81.81 49.86
Ours 90.87 71.02 39.53 88.80 56.59
A.3 Detailed results on out-of-distribution detection
For the evaluation of OOD performance we use datasets not seen during train-
ing time. In detail, for CIFAR10 we use: SVHN, CIFAR100, downscaled Im-
agetNet with the CIFAR10 classes removed, the classroom set of LSUN [70], as
well as uniform noise images and smoothed noise [25], for SVHN: same, SVHN
exchanged with CIFAR10, for CIFAR100: same, CIFAR100 exchanged with CI-
FAR10. For Restricted ImageNet we use datasets with higher image resolution:
Flowers[50], Food101[38], FGVC Aircraft[42], Cars[32] and uniform noise. The
detailed results for the out-of-distribution detection performance of all models
can be found in Table 6 for CIFAR10, SVHN and CIFAR100 and in Table 7 for
restricted ImageNet. The summary tables in the main paper have provided the
average AUC and average worst case AUC over the respective out-of-distribution
datasets.
B Experimental Setup
B.1 CIFAR10
For our experiments on CIFAR10 [33] we use a standard ResNet50 architecture
and SGD with Nesterov momentum (β = 0.9) and a base learning rate of 0.1
and weight decay of 5e − 4. Our training schedule spans 220 epochs and we
decrease the learning rate by a factor of 10 in epochs 100, 150 and 200. As data
augmentation for all our trained CIFAR10 models we use the recommended
AutoAugment policy from [16], including Cutout [17].
For adversarial and RATIO training on CIFAR10, we use 100% adversarial
training on the train distribution, i.e. the model only sees perturbed samples
during training. Instead of solving the robust min-max formulation (equation 4)
directly, we use the logits-based loss from [9] in the inner maximization problem,
i.e. for a training sample (x, y) we approximately solve:
max
z∈T (x)
max
i 6=y
fi(z)− fy(z). (8)
To compute z, we use a 7-step PGD with the l2-normalized gradient with step
size 0.1 and momentum weight 0.9 which returns the point with the highest
loss across its trajectory. This deviation from the standard adversarial training
scheme of [41] is justified by our empirical experience that for this small number
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Table 5: Radii and number of inner optimization steps for the different methods
when applicable.
CIFAR10 Plain OE ACET M0.5 AT0.5 AT0.25 JEM-0 R0.5 R0.25
AT radius - - - 0.5 0.5 0.25 - 0.5 0.25
AT steps - - - 7 7 7 - 7 7
ACET radius - - 1.0 - - - - 1.0 1.0
ACET steps - - 20-40 - - - - 20-40 20-40
of steps the optimization of the logits-based loss even leads to higher cross-
entropy loss than optimizing the cross-entropy loss directly. Note that for the
actual update of the model we use the gradient of the cross-entropy loss.
The same scheme applies to the inner maximization problem for the adversar-
ial training on the out-distribution (cross-entropy loss to uniform distribution,
see also equation 5) in ACET and RATIO training, where we again use PGD
with momentum and a step size of 0.1. We again emphasize that unlike [24] who
used a smoothed form of noise as out-distribution, we use 80 Million Tiny Im-
ages which makes ACET resp. the adversarial training on the out-distribution
a substantially harder task. As the radius of the l2-threat model on the out-
distribution is significantly larger than on the in-distribution we increase the
initial number of iterations to 20. For pure ACET training we noticed that even
a 20-step attack is often too weak to find an approximate maximum of the inner
maximization problem which results in the model gradually becoming less ro-
bust. We therefore incrementally increase the number of ACET iterations to 40
by adding 5 steps for each update of the learning rate. However even with those
adjustments, pure ACET training on CIFAR10 remains very unstable and repro-
ducibly ends up with a maximum-mean confidence close to 0.1 for CIFAR10 test
samples. We therefore use a smaller ResNet18 with a 100 epoch schedule for all
ACET experiments where this training scheme can be used without problems.
We note that RATIO does not suffer from ACET’s stability problems and in
this setting the training reliably works.
The threat models are l2-balls of radius 0.25 resp. 0.5 on the in-distribution
and a l2-ball of radius 1.0 n the out-distribution. The number of iterations and
the radii of the threat model for the different methods are summarized in Table 5.
We use a batch size of 128 for plain and adversarial training and a total batch
size of 256 for OE, ACET and RATIO training, i.e. 128 samples from the in-
and 128 samples from the out-distribution.
As adversarial training is prone to overfitting on the training set [53], result-
ing in a loss in robust accuracy on the test set in the last epochs of training, we
use the robust accuracy on the test set under the 7 step PGD attack as early
stopping criterion (note that the 7-step PGD attack is significantly weaker than
what we use later on for evaluation of robustness).
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Table 6: OOD performance (CIFAR10, SVHN, CIFAR100): The area under
the ROC curve (AUC) on the binary task of separating the in- from the out-
distribution based on the confidence. For each dataset the first table shows the
average-case AUC and the second ones show the worst-case AUC with a threat
model l2 = 1.0 around the out-distribution samples.
CIFAR10
Av. Case Plain OE ACET M0.5 AT0.5 AT0.25 JEM-0 R0.5 R0.25
SVHN 96.8 99.4 93.6 91.9 93.5 95.3 89.3 96.5 96.4
CIFAR100 91.6 91.4 90.4 84.3 85.3 89.1 87.6 90.8 91.6
LSUN CR 95.6 99.6 98.2 89.7 90.7 92.5 91.6 98.0 98.3
Imagenet- 91.6 89.8 91.0 84.8 85.9 89.0 86.7 90.5 91.3
Noise 94.3 99.3 95.0 93.7 94.9 95.5 83.1 97.8 97.6
Uni. Noise 95.0 99.5 99.9 46.1 83.2 94.6 11.8 99.9 99.9
Worst Case Plain OE ACET M0.5 AT0.5 AT0.25 JEM-0 R0.5 R0.25
SVHN 0.0 0.6 76.1 57.1 62.0 40.1 7.3 81.3 81.1
CIFAR100 0.0 2.7 69.9 47.9 48.5 31.8 19.2 71.9 73.0
LSUN CR 0.0 4.0 87.9 52.0 52.8 36.5 20.6 87.3 89.1
Imagenet- 0.0 1.5 72.8 50.6 51.1 36.8 21.2 72.4 73.5
Noise 0.0 0.0 84.5 62.9 67.9 38.8 16.5 88.9 89.4
Uni. Noise 9.4 43.1 99.9 20.7 62.0 67.8 2.5 99.8 99.8
SVHN
Av. Case Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
CIFAR10 95.8 100.0 100.0 88.5 95.7 100.0 100.0
CIFAR100 95.6 100.0 100.0 87.8 95.5 100.0 100.0
LSUN CR 97.1 100.0 100.0 87.3 95.8 100.0 100.0
Imagenet- 96.2 100.0 100.0 87.9 95.9 100.0 100.0
Noise 97.2 97.8 99.2 97.5 99.2 99.1 99.5
Uni. Noise 99.9 100.0 100.0 97.2 99.7 100.0 99.9
Worst Case Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
CIFAR10 0.0 1.3 99.8 43.4 43.7 99.8 99.8
CIFAR100 0.0 2.5 99.8 42.7 39.5 99.7 99.8
LSUN CR 0.0 1.0 99.8 36.6 42.4 99.9 99.9
Imagenet- 0.0 4.3 99.8 39.4 43.7 99.9 99.9
Noise 0.0 0.0 76.8 71.2 52.7 85.6 85.7
Uni. Noise 51.1 99.9 99.9 73.0 67.7 99.9 99.9
CIFAR100
Av. Case Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
SVHN 86.8 95.8 - 82.2 81.0 83.8 84.5
CIFAR10 81.1 84.3 - 73.0 76.0 71.9 73.2
LSUN CR 83.1 97.5 - 81.0 80.4 93.6 91.7
Imagenet- 83.9 86.2 - 74.3 77.7 79.6 81.0
Noise 85.9 87.6 - 84.8 82.3 93.0 91.1
Uni. Noise 73.2 99.7 - 58.5 78.7 99.8 99.6
Worst Case Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
SVHN 0.0 5.6 - 30.2 20.6 41.4 42.6
CIFAR10 0.0 5.0 - 27.3 18.9 31.3 28.9
LSUN CR 0.0 5.0 - 30.0 21.3 58.9 59.2
Imagenet- 0.0 4.9 - 31.3 23.3 34.1 31.3
Noise 0.0 6.2 - 32.6 22.2 68.3 67.5
Uni. Noise 2.5 60.6 - 27.9 42.2 99.2 97.5
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Table 7: OOD performance (R. ImageNet): The area under the ROC curve
(AUC) on the binary task of separating the in- from the out-distribution based
on the confidence. For each dataset the first table shows the average-case AUC
and the second ones show the worst-case AUC with a threat model l2 = 7.0
around the out-distribution samples.
R.ImageNet
Av. Case Plain OE ACET M3.5 AT3.5 AT1.75 R3.5 R1.75
Flowers 90.6 96.2 94.1 74.4 79.8 83.2 91.3 92.8
Food101 91.6 99.3 98.3 79.9 83.8 86.9 98.1 98.7
FGVC 89.6 99.7 98.8 79.8 80.8 81.5 98.8 99.1
Cars 93.9 99.9 99.9 83.5 86.3 90.0 99.8 99.9
Uni. Noise 98.7 99.6 100.0 95.9 88.2 87.4 100.0 100.0
Worst Case Plain OE ACET M3.5 AT3.5 AT1.75 R3.5 R1.75
SVHN 0.0 1.8 83.4 32.2 35.9 16.1 86.6 86.5
CIFAR10 0.0 1.8 87.7 33.3 32.5 11.9 90.6 90.5
LSUN CR 0.0 1.8 92.4 39.5 33.0 13.6 95.8 95.7
Imagenet- 0.0 1.8 94.0 44.7 50.0 31.8 97.9 97.9
Uni. Noise 0.0 1.8 100.0 83.6 43.3 16.1 100.0 99.9
B.2 SVHN
Our SVHN training scheme is similar to the CIFAR10 schedule, in particular
the chosen radii and number of steps are identical for all training methods. The
only differences are the model architecture and data augmentation. For SVHN,
we use a ResNet18 architecture with a 100 epochs schedule which decreases the
learning rate in epochs 50, 75 and 90. The data augmentation scheme consists
of input normalization, random cropping and Cutout.
B.3 CIFAR100
Our CIFAR100 schedule is an exact replicate of the CIFAR10 schedule. However
we were not able to train an OD-robust ResNet18 or ResNet50 ACET model.
Throughout multiple training runs with different PGD schedules and different
data augmentation schemes, the training failed as the the attack was not able
to approximate the inner maximization problem, resulting in a model with un-
expected worst-case out-distribution performance. We therefore decided to not
include any ACET Cifar100 results. We further note that RATIO trained per-
fectly stable despite its use of the same ACET loss.
B.4 Restricted ImageNet
To demonstrate the feasibility of our method on higher-resolution images, we use
restricted ImageNet[57], a subset of the ILSVRC2012 dataset[55]. It contains 9
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super-classes, consisting of 118 (”dog”) to 3 (”frog”) individual ILSVRC2012
classes. We adopt the overall training scheme from [57], including the ResNet50
architecture and data augmentation with a slightly shorter 75 epoch LR schedule
which decays the initial LR of 0.1 at epochs 30, 60 and 75 by a factor of 10. We
also tested the AutoAugment ImageNet policy, however, found that it performed
worse than the simpler transform based on random crops, flips, color jitter and
a lighting transformation.
As 80 million tiny images only contains images with a resolution of 32x32
and we want to make use of the full 224x224 native resolution of the ImageNet
ResNet50 models, we use all the remaining classes from ILSVRC2012 as out-
distribution for RATIO and ACET training.
As a result of the larger image resolution, we scale up the l2 radii and use 1.75
and 3.5 in place of 0.25 and 0.5 on the in-distribution and 7.0 instead of 1.0 for
out-distribution worst-case training. We continue using the 7 step PGD during
training on the in-distribution with a stepsize of 0.7. Due to computational
complexity, we use a simple 10 step PGD with a stepsize of 1.0 on the out-
distribution instead of increasing the number of iterations during training. On
restricted ImageNet, we noticed an unexpected drop in clean accuracy on the
larger RATIO models and therefore add an additional clean in-distribution loss
to the RATIO and AT models. In detail, adversarial training uses a 50/50 scheme
with 128 standard and 128 perturbed samples per batch while RATIO uses 128
clean and 128 perturbed samples from the in-distribution and 128 perturbed
samples from the out distribution, resulting in a total batch-size of 384. Such a
scheme typically improves clean accuracy while reducing the robustness, however
we note that our 50/50 AT models are able to compete with Madry’s standard
AT model (100% adversarial training) and are thus a fair baseline for RATIO.
C Calibration on the In-Distribution by Temperature
Rescaling
We follow [23] and compute the expected calibration error (ECE) by grouping
the confidences in M equally sized bins Bm ⊂ [1/K, 1] and then estimate the
ECE via:
ECE =
M∑
m=1
|Bm|
n
|acc(Bm)− conf(Bm)| . (9)
On the validation set we use 10 bins (note that validation sets are small than
the test set) and for the evaluation of the final calibration on the test set we
use 15 bins. For the finding the temperature we pick 500 geometrically spaced
temperatures on the interval T ∈ [0.05, 2.71] and choose the minimizer for each
model. Since M0.5 and JEM-0 have used the entire training set and removing
data from the test set would make the accuracy values harder to compare, we
use the CIFAR10.1 dataset [52] for calibration on CIFAR10. On SVHN we use
2000 points from the unused additional data, on CIFAR100 the first 2000 test
points and on R.Imagenet we use a random subset of 2000 test points as our
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Table 8: Calibration: The ECE on the 2000 point validation set before (ECEb)
and after (ECEa) temperature rescaling, as well as the temperature minimizing
the ECE on the validation set.
CIFAR10 Plain OE ACET M0.5 AT0.5 AT0.25 JEM-0 R0.5 R0.25
ECEb (in %) 4.8 14.1 31.5 4.0 2.0 4.3 10.6 25.0 26.1
T 1.61 0.10 0.35 1.20 1.11 1.39 1.88 0.41 0.43
ECEa (in %) 0.7 6.5 6.7 1.8 1.0 1.0 2.9 5.7 4.6
SVHN Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
ECEb (in %) 0.5 0.5 0.9 3.0 0.8 3.3 1.2
T 1.01 0.97 0.49 0.86 0.57 1.10 0.85
ECEa (in %) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.8
CIFAR100 Plain OE ACET AT0.5 AT0.25 R0.5 R0.25
ECEb (in %) 7.0 12.6 - 3.6 1.3 24.3 22.8
T 1.43 0.63 - 0.86 1.02 0.60 0.67
ECEa (in %) 1.2 7.5 - 1.5 1.1 2.4 2.1
R.ImageNet Plain OE ACET M3.5 AT3.5 AT1.75 R3.5 R1.75
ECEb (in %) 0.7 4.5 26.9 2.8 1.6 0.9 15.3 15.4
T 1.17 0.55 0.34 0.88 1.01 0.96 0.49 0.49
ECEa (in %) 0.3 1.3 1.08 1.6 1.5 0.7 1.2 1.1
validation set. For CIFAR100 and R.Imagenet we omit these 2000 points when
testing the OOD performance.
The results on the validation sets are given in Table 8. Note that all models
that rely on an out-distribution (OE, ACET, RATIO) are initially highly uncal-
ibrated on the in-distribution. The reason is simply that they were trained on
the distribution pjoint(x, y) =
1
2pin(x, y) +
1
2pout(x, y) so they produce undercon-
fident predictions on pin. This effect is far weaker for SVHN because TinyImages
can be separated from SVHN much more easily than from CIFAR10 and thus the
effect on the in-distribution confidences is much lower. On CIFAR10, if we com-
pute the ECE with respect to the distribution where half the samples are drawn
from the in-distribution and half the samples from the out-distribution with a
randomly selected label, then the out-distribution trained models achieve drasti-
cally lower ECEs, whereas the models that are only trained on the in-distribution
receive much higher scores, e.g. on the CIFAR10 test set the (non-temperature
rescaled) AT0.5 model goes from an ECE of 1.1 on pin to 24.2 on pjoint, while
RATIO0.25 improves from 20.0 to 6.6. This is why minimizing the ECE on the
validation set by temperature rescaling is necessary in order to directly compare
the confidence values of differently trained models.
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D Additional Samples
We provide additional samples of the visual counterfactuals and feature genera-
tion from OOD images. Moreover, we have a separate section where we discuss
failure cases of our and other methods.
D.1 Visual Counterfactuals
In Figure 2 we generated visual counterfactual explanations on test images that
were misclassified by all models. For space reasons we omitted some models which
we present now in Figures 8 and 9 as well as Figures 17 and 18 for CIFAR10 and
SVHN respectively. For the reader’s convenience we also repeat the samples from
the main paper in these figures for better comparison. As already demonstrated
in Figure 1, the non-robust models (Plain and OE) have no interpretable visual
counterfactuals. JEM-0 produces some visible class features but introduces severe
artefacts so that JEM-0 is inferior in its “generative” properties compared to
ACET, AT and RATIO. The other models are qualitatively similar to each
other since they all exhibit adversarial robustness on the in-distribution. For the
models shown in the main text, we present additional visual counterfactuals in
Figures 10 through 12 for CIFAR10 and Figures 19 through 21 for SVHN. On
CIFAR10 ACET, AT0.5 and RATIO0.25 all show good generative performance.
In order to avoid cherry picking we also demonstrate this on a random selection
of visual counterfactuals (we show 48 randomly selected test samples from the set
of 70 test points that all models classify wrongly) at radius  = 3.0 in Figure 13
for CIFAR10. Interestingly ACET achieves good generative performance around
the in-distribution with smaller in-distribution robustness than both AT and
RATIO models.
On SVHN we also observe that ACET, AT0.5 and RATIO0.25 perform very
well at generating plausible counterfactuals. Surprisingly, AT0.25 performs much
worse as it introduces many visual artefacts. This is in so far interesting as the in-
distribution robustness of AT0.25 is very similar to RATIO0.25. This suggests that
robustness to the out-distribution improves the generative properties. Again, we
show a panel of 48 randomly chosen visual counterfactuals in Figure 22 (out of
the 199 images which are misclassified by all methods). Note that the reason
for the common misclassification is often that the labels of these cases are either
completely wrong or the label is correct for some digit shown but not for the more
central digit which should be predicted (already in the first row of 8 images there
are 4 obviously wrong cases). In particular for high contrast images generating
a meaningful visual counterfactual with an l2-budget of 3.0 is very difficult.
Further visual counterfactuals for both AT and RATIO models on CIFAR100
can be found in Figures 26 to 28 and restricted ImageNet in Figures 32 to 34.
Additionally, we present an randomly generated overview for CIFAR100 in Fig-
ure 29 and restricted ImageNet in Figure 35. Despite the increased complexity
of CIFAR100, the models are mostly able to produce meaningful counterfactu-
als and RATIO often yields a higher image quality than standard adversarial
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training. The overview plot for CIFAR100 however shows that the overall coun-
terfactual quality for CIFAR100 is worse than for CIFAR10 or SVHN. This is to
be expected as the number of samples per class is ten times smaller in compari-
son to CIFAR10 which makes it hard to learn class specific features, especially
when the model has to distinguish fine grained classes like ”oak”, ”maple” and
other tree species.
Even though the generation of high quality images in 224x224 directly in
image space is a very challenging task, the samples show that robust models
are able to produce high quality counterfactuals. Often the changes integrate
seamlessly into the reference image by only adding specific textures or details
and thereby removing the ground-truth subject. However, it can also be the case
that the new class features are painted on top of the existing image and often
remain slightly transparent due to the fixed l2 budget. We further discuss this
in Section D.3. Throughout our experiments, the average image quality for the
different restricted ImageNet models appears to be about equal and there is no
model that clearly outperforms the others.
D.2 Feature Generation on OOD images
In Figure 7 we showed examples of class specific feature generation where we
started from samples of the 80 million tiny images dataset not seen during train-
ing and maximized the confidence in the predicted class on the original images
within l2-balls of different sizes. We omitted some models there because their
results are either trivial, in the sense that they do not generate visible features
(Plain and OE), or are qualitatively similar to other models that we presented
(M0.5, AT0.25, RATIO0.5). For completeness we show the missing models on the
same starting points as in the main text in Figure 14 and Figure 23 respectively.
We also give additional examples of feature generation in Figures 15 through 16
for CIFAR10 as well as Figures 24 through 25 for SVHN.
Note that as more class specific features appear, the confidences of RATIO
and ACET increase much more gradually than for the other models. In particular
on the original images they have very low confidence if class-specific features are
not already present. AT0.5 and JEM-0 have both very little robustness on the
out-distribution and therefore make overconfident predictions long before visible
class features emerge. To make this observation more quantitative we provided
Figure 5 in the main paper. It shows that the mean confidence on worst-case
OOD samples is only high at relatively large radii for RATIO and ACET, where
clearly real features can already be present, but for Plain, OE, AT and JEM-0 it
is already high for a much smaller radius where class-specific features on average
have not appeared yet.
The qualitiative appearance for CIFAR10 is similar to the visual counter-
factuals. JEM-0 produces some class-specific features but also a lot of artefacts
and in general the generated images look worse than the ones of ACET, AT
and RATIO. For SVHN the picture is similar even though JEM-0 is even more
overconfident on the original images. However, here the generated images for
RATIO0.25 seem qualitatively better than all other methods as they have fewer
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artefacts and stronger class-specific features. Note that in two cases the targeted
attack on the ACET model does not find any images of high confidence. This is
fine if indeed no class-specific features can be generated within the threat model
for the class predicted for the original image.
Additional OD samples for CIFAR100 can be found in Figures 30 and 31 and
Figures 36 and 37 contain restricted ImageNet samples for l2 radii from 3.5 to 21.
For CIFAR100, all models are mostly able to generate class specific features for
the larger radii, however even after calibration, AT remains overconfident and
assigns high confidences for images without recognizable features. Both RATIO
models on the other hand mostly assign a low confidence to OD images and
smoothly increase their confidence with the appearance of class structures.
The OD behaviour of our restricted ImageNet models is also similar to that
of the other datasets. While the quality of the final images is rather consis-
tent across models, the AT models are again overconfident whereas the RATIO
models assign noticeable lower confidences to the out-distribution images.
D.3 Failure Cases
While RATIO manages to improve on the state-of-the-art in several ways, RA-
TIO is not yet a perfect model and we want to illustrate some failure cases.
We present several failures in Figures 38 through 43. First, it can happen that
the counterfactual explanations are not very informative to a human observer.
On CIFAR10 we observed this problem in distinguishing the “car” and “truck”
classes. When performing feature generation even with RATIO it is still pos-
sible that the confidence in the targeted class rises much more sharply than is
desirable or worse, high confidence is achieved even when nearly no visible class-
specific features are present. However, we stress that the failures are common to
all the models that we tested and thus present challenges for future work.
On SVHN many of our failures to generate plausible counterfactuals have to
do with the test data being either clearly mislabeled or unrecognizable. Even
though it is impossible to properly inpaint the target number with the given
budget, RATIO sometimes still makes high confidence predictions even though
these cases are rare.
On Cifar100 most failures occur for one of the four classes ”girl”, ”woman”,
”boy” or ”man”, as can be seen in the failure examples in Figures 44 to 45.
Despite the fact that human anatomy is complex and our visual system being
especially observant towards images containing humans, we believe that for RA-
TIO the failure cases are also caused by the fact that our out-distribution dataset
during training contains a significant number of humans. Thus, the enforcement
of uniform confidence in a neighbourhood around those datapoints could result
in worse generative performance for the related classes.
Figures 47 to 49 show some failures for the restricted ImageNet models. While
the models are mostly able to generate class specific features, they are often
layered on top of the original image instead of cleverly manipulating existing
image structures. This is likely caused by the higher dimensional image space
in combination with our simple l2 threat model, which promotes many small
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changes instead of few sparse ones. This can also cause images that show multiple
individual structures, for example different dog heads, instead of one connected
structure. Overall we could, however, barely find any failure cases that do not
show any class features, even though all models are clearly overconfident in
certain situations. They assign extremely high confidence values to transparent
class structures layered on top of an existing image or other barely visible class
features. We believe that to achieve an even better quality on high resolution
images, it might be necessary to replace the simple l2 based threat model with
a more localized one.
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cat: 0.45
dog: 0.83
cat: 0.13
dog: 0.99
cat: 0.01
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 0.04
cat: 0.93
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
Fig. 8: Visual Counterfactuals for all 9 CIFAR10 models (extension of Figure 2).
The original test image (top left) has been misclassified by all models. Per model,
we generate images which increase the confidence in the grounth truth class
(upper row) and falsely predicted class (bottom row) for varying l2 budgets.
Continues on next page.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
T
-0
.5
0
dog: 0.05
frog: 0.66
dog: 0.46
frog: 0.03
dog: 0.89
frog: 0.01
dog: 0.99
frog: 0.00
dog: 1.00
frog: 0.00
dog: 1.00
frog: 0.00
dog: 1.00
frog: 0.00
dog: 0.01
frog: 0.89
dog: 0.00
frog: 0.99
dog: 0.00
frog: 1.00
dog: 0.00
frog: 1.00
dog: 0.00
frog: 1.00
dog: 0.00
frog: 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
dog: 0.02
cat: 0.81
dog: 0.82
cat: 0.15
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
J
E
M
-0
dog: 0.04
cat: 0.71
dog: 0.99
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 0.99
dog: 0.00
cat: 0.99
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.5
0
dog: 0.01
frog: 0.78
dog: 0.36
frog: 0.09
dog: 0.96
frog: 0.01
dog: 0.99
frog: 0.00
dog: 1.00
frog: 0.00
dog: 1.00
frog: 0.00
dog: 1.00
frog: 0.00
dog: 0.00
frog: 0.97
dog: 0.00
frog: 0.99
dog: 0.00
frog: 1.00
dog: 0.00
frog: 1.00
dog: 0.00
frog: 1.00
dog: 0.00
frog: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
dog: 0.01
cat: 0.95
dog: 0.97
cat: 0.01
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 1.00
cat: 0.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 0.99
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
dog: 0.00
cat: 1.00
Fig. 9: Visual Counterfactuals for all 9 CIFAR10 models (extension of Figure 2)
(continued).
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
deer: 0.00
cat: 0.68
deer: 0.99
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 0.00
cat: 0.99
deer: 0.00
cat: 0.99
deer: 0.00
cat: 1.00
deer: 0.00
cat: 1.00
deer: 0.00
cat: 1.00
deer: 0.00
cat: 1.00
J
E
M
-0
deer: 0.03
cat: 0.80
deer: 0.99
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 1.00
cat: 0.00
deer: 0.00
cat: 0.99
deer: 0.00
cat: 0.99
deer: 0.00
cat: 1.00
deer: 0.00
cat: 1.00
deer: 0.00
cat: 1.00
deer: 0.00
cat: 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
deer: 0.10
bird: 0.67
deer: 0.54
bird: 0.40
deer: 0.89
bird: 0.05
deer: 1.00
bird: 0.00
deer: 1.00
bird: 0.00
deer: 1.00
bird: 0.00
deer: 1.00
bird: 0.00
deer: 0.01
bird: 0.94
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
deer: 0.01
bird: 0.68
deer: 0.96
bird: 0.01
deer: 0.99
bird: 0.00
deer: 1.00
bird: 0.00
deer: 1.00
bird: 0.00
deer: 1.00
bird: 0.00
deer: 1.00
bird: 0.00
deer: 0.00
bird: 0.99
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
deer: 0.00
bird: 1.00
Fig. 10: Additional Visual Counterfactuals for CIFAR10 test samples misclassi-
fied by all methods. RATIO0.25 and AT0.5 produce images of similar high qual-
ity whereas JEM-0 generates strong noise patterns and less visible class specific
features. ACET produces identifiable features, but with a lower quality than
RATIO0.25 and AT0.5.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
horse: 0.04
cat: 0.84
horse: 0.98
cat: 0.00
horse: 0.99
cat: 0.00
horse: 1.00
cat: 0.00
horse: 1.00
cat: 0.00
horse: 1.00
cat: 0.00
horse: 1.00
cat: 0.00
horse: 0.00
cat: 0.97
horse: 0.00
cat: 0.99
horse: 0.00
cat: 1.00
horse: 0.00
cat: 1.00
horse: 0.00
cat: 1.00
horse: 0.00
cat: 1.00
J
E
M
-0
horse: 0.02
deer: 0.64
horse: 0.95
deer: 0.02
horse: 0.99
deer: 0.00
horse: 1.00
deer: 0.00
horse: 1.00
deer: 0.00
horse: 1.00
deer: 0.00
horse: 1.00
deer: 0.00
horse: 0.00
deer: 0.98
horse: 0.00
deer: 0.99
horse: 0.00
deer: 1.00
horse: 0.00
deer: 1.00
horse: 0.00
deer: 1.00
horse: 0.00
deer: 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
horse: 0.02
deer: 0.42
horse: 0.61
deer: 0.06
horse: 0.96
deer: 0.02
horse: 1.00
deer: 0.00
horse: 1.00
deer: 0.00
horse: 1.00
deer: 0.00
horse: 1.00
deer: 0.00
horse: 0.01
deer: 0.79
horse: 0.00
deer: 0.99
horse: 0.00
deer: 1.00
horse: 0.00
deer: 1.00
horse: 0.00
deer: 1.00
horse: 0.00
deer: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
horse: 0.02
cat: 0.69
horse: 0.11
cat: 0.57
horse: 0.95
cat: 0.01
horse: 1.00
cat: 0.00
horse: 1.00
cat: 0.00
horse: 1.00
cat: 0.00
horse: 1.00
cat: 0.00
horse: 0.01
cat: 0.95
horse: 0.00
cat: 0.98
horse: 0.00
cat: 1.00
horse: 0.00
cat: 1.00
horse: 0.00
cat: 1.00
horse: 0.00
cat: 1.00
Fig. 11: Additional Visual Counterfactuals for misclassified samples from the
CIFAR10 test set. Even though RATIO0.25 was trained with a smaller radius on
in-distribution samples than AT0.5, it is the only model capable of generating a
realistic horse head for larger radii.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
bird: 0.00
ship: 0.99
bird: 0.97
ship: 0.02
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
J
E
M
-0
bird: 0.01
ship: 0.91
bird: 0.46
ship: 0.29
bird: 0.98
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 0.98
bird: 0.00
ship: 0.99
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
bird: 0.24
ship: 0.70
bird: 0.59
ship: 0.29
bird: 0.94
ship: 0.02
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 0.03
ship: 0.95
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
bird: 0.03
ship: 0.95
bird: 0.95
ship: 0.03
bird: 0.99
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 1.00
ship: 0.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 0.99
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
bird: 0.00
ship: 1.00
Fig. 12: Additional Visual Counterfactuals for misclassified samples from the
CIFAR10 test set. All models except JEM-0 generate realistic images for both
target classes.
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Original ACET
cat frog dog dog dog bird dog horse cat frog dog dog dog bird dog horse
bird ship ship bird bird dog cat deer bird ship ship bird bird dog cat deer
bird deer bird frog frog deer truck dog bird deer bird frog frog deer truck dog
truck horse bird bird bird cat dog truck truck horse bird bird bird cat dog truck
deer plane car car dog horse cat cat deer plane car car dog horse cat cat
cat dog cat deer cat car plane dog cat dog cat deer cat car plane dog
JEM-0 AT-0.5
RATIO-0.5 RATIO-0.25
Fig. 13: More Visual Counterfactuals: Random selection of 48 CIFAR10 test
images misclassified by all models (top left shows original images together with
ground truth labels) and the associated visual counterfactuals that are generated
by maximizing the confidence in the ground truth class in a l2 ball of radius 3.
Note that some images like the frog on the left in the bottom row are clearly
mislabeled.
36 M. Augustin, A. Meinke, M. Hein
Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
P
la
in
truck - 0.60 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
O
E
truck - 0.21 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
A
C
E
T
truck - 0.11 truck - 0.16 truck - 0.50 truck - 0.99 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
M
-0
.5
0
truck - 0.52 truck - 0.89 truck - 0.99 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
truck - 0.26 truck - 0.84 truck - 0.99 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
truck - 0.76 truck - 0.98 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
J
E
M
-0
cat - 0.54 cat - 0.87 cat - 0.95 cat - 0.98 cat - 0.99 cat - 0.99 cat - 1.00
R
-0
.5
truck - 0.12 truck - 0.18 truck - 0.35 truck - 0.85 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
cat - 0.13 cat - 0.20 cat - 0.34 cat - 0.69 cat - 0.97 cat - 1.00 cat - 1.00
Fig. 14: Feature Generation for out-distribution images: Extension of Fig-
ure 7 in the main paper to all models.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
plane - 0.51 plane - 0.87 plane - 0.99 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00
J
E
M
-0
plane - 0.87 plane - 0.97 plane - 0.99 plane - 0.99 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
plane - 0.97 plane - 0.99 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
plane - 0.19 plane - 0.49 plane - 0.96 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00 plane - 1.00
A
C
E
T
truck - 0.11 truck - 0.19 truck - 0.59 truck - 0.99 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
J
E
M
-0
truck - 0.91 truck - 0.94 truck - 0.96 truck - 0.97 truck - 0.98 truck - 0.98 truck - 0.99
A
T
-0
.5
0
truck - 0.92 truck - 0.99 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
truck - 0.17 truck - 0.32 truck - 0.66 truck - 0.94 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00 truck - 1.00
Fig. 15: Feature Generation for OOD images: for CIFAR10 models for un-
seen examples from 80 million tiny images. AT0.5 is overconfident on the out-
distribution samples, but produces high quality samples for sufficiently large
radii. JEM-0 is also overly confident and generates its characteristic noise pat-
terns. RATIO0.25 produces high quality samples and the confidence increases as
more class-specific features appear.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
bird - 0.56 bird - 0.80 bird - 0.91 bird - 0.98 bird - 1.00 bird - 1.00 bird - 1.00
J
E
M
-0
bird - 0.85 bird - 0.98 bird - 1.00 bird - 1.00 bird - 1.00 bird - 1.00 bird - 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
deer - 0.48 deer - 0.65 deer - 0.96 deer - 1.00 deer - 1.00 deer - 1.00 deer - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
deer - 0.34 deer - 0.77 deer - 0.91 deer - 0.99 deer - 1.00 deer - 1.00 deer - 1.00
A
C
E
T
car - 0.56 car - 0.93 car - 0.99 car - 1.00 car - 1.00 car - 1.00 car - 1.00
J
E
M
-0
truck - 0.88 truck - 0.92 truck - 0.94 truck - 0.96 truck - 0.97 truck - 0.98 truck - 0.98
A
T
-0
.5
0
ship - 0.63 ship - 0.95 ship - 1.00 ship - 1.00 ship - 1.00 ship - 1.00 ship - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
car - 0.37 car - 0.77 car - 0.97 car - 1.00 car - 1.00 car - 1.00 car - 1.00
Fig. 16: Feature Generation for OOD images: for CIFAR10 models for un-
seen examples from 80 million tiny images. Despite the low robustness, ACET,
AT0.5 and RATIO0.25 are able to generate meaningful class-specific features.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
P
la
in
5: 0.18
6: 0.80
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
O
E
5: 0.20
6: 0.74
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
A
C
E
T
5: 0.10
4: 0.11
5: 0.39
4: 0.08
5: 0.98
4: 0.00
5: 1.00
4: 0.00
5: 1.00
4: 0.00
5: 1.00
4: 0.00
5: 1.00
4: 0.00
5: 0.07
4: 0.43
5: 0.00
4: 0.97
5: 0.00
4: 1.00
5: 0.00
4: 1.00
5: 0.00
4: 1.00
5: 0.00
4: 1.00
Fig. 17: Visual Counterfactuals for all 7 SVHN models (extension of Fig-
ure 3 in the main paper). The test image (top left) has been misclassified by
all models. Per model, we generate images which increase the confidence in the
ground truth class (upper row) and falsely predicted class (bottom row) for vary-
ing l2 budgets. While non-robust models only generate noise patterns, the less
robust ACET models produce higher quality images than AT0.25. The samples
from RATIO-0.25 show that adversarial out-distribution training clearly im-
proves generative capabilities over AT0.25 which has comparable in-distribution
robustness. Continues on next page.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
T
-0
.5
0
5: 0.00
6: 0.99
5: 0.07
6: 0.54
5: 0.99
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
5: 0.03
6: 0.83
5: 0.94
6: 0.02
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.5
0
5: 0.11
3: 0.14
5: 0.33
3: 0.29
5: 0.97
3: 0.02
5: 1.00
3: 0.00
5: 1.00
3: 0.00
5: 1.00
3: 0.00
5: 1.00
3: 0.00
5: 0.16
3: 0.57
5: 0.00
3: 1.00
5: 0.00
3: 1.00
5: 0.00
3: 1.00
5: 0.00
3: 1.00
5: 0.00
3: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
5: 0.09
6: 0.14
5: 0.19
6: 0.25
5: 0.89
6: 0.04
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 0.05
6: 0.65
5: 0.00
6: 0.99
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
Fig. 18: Visual Counterfactuals Figure 17 continued, see page before for a
description (extension of Figure 3 in the main paper).
Adversarial Robustness on In- and Out-Distribution Improves Explainability 41
Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
2: 0.41
7: 0.44
2: 0.99
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 0.00
7: 0.99
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
2: 0.25
7: 0.75
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
2: 0.27
7: 0.71
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 0.00
7: 0.99
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
2: 0.09
7: 0.56
2: 0.98
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 1.00
7: 0.00
2: 0.00
7: 0.99
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
2: 0.00
7: 1.00
Fig. 19: Visual Counterfactuals on SVHN test samples misclassified by all
methods. Especially AT0.25 generates strong distortion patterns instead of class
specific features, whereas RATIO0.25 produces samples with a quality which at
least matches that of AT0.5.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
1: 0.11
3: 0.13
1: 0.41
3: 0.11
1: 0.97
3: 0.01
1: 1.00
3: 0.00
1: 1.00
3: 0.00
1: 1.00
3: 0.00
1: 1.00
3: 0.00
1: 0.04
3: 0.70
1: 0.00
3: 0.99
1: 0.00
3: 1.00
1: 0.00
3: 1.00
1: 0.00
3: 1.00
1: 0.00
3: 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
1: 0.00
6: 0.37
1: 0.00
6: 0.16
1: 0.62
6: 0.02
1: 0.99
6: 0.00
1: 1.00
6: 0.00
1: 1.00
6: 0.00
1: 1.00
6: 0.00
1: 0.00
6: 0.93
1: 0.00
6: 1.00
1: 0.00
6: 1.00
1: 0.00
6: 1.00
1: 0.00
6: 1.00
1: 0.00
6: 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
1: 0.02
6: 0.25
1: 0.59
6: 0.07
1: 0.99
6: 0.00
1: 1.00
6: 0.00
1: 1.00
6: 0.00
1: 1.00
6: 0.00
1: 1.00
6: 0.00
1: 0.01
6: 0.82
1: 0.00
6: 0.97
1: 0.00
6: 1.00
1: 0.00
6: 1.00
1: 0.00
6: 1.00
1: 0.00
6: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
1: 0.09
3: 0.16
1: 0.24
3: 0.36
1: 0.77
3: 0.13
1: 0.99
3: 0.01
1: 1.00
3: 0.00
1: 1.00
3: 0.00
1: 1.00
3: 0.00
1: 0.08
3: 0.65
1: 0.00
3: 0.98
1: 0.00
3: 1.00
1: 0.00
3: 1.00
1: 0.00
3: 1.00
1: 0.00
3: 1.00
Fig. 20: Visual Counterfactuals on SVHN test samples misclassified by all
methods. ACET, AT0.5 and RATIO0.25 produce for the true class super-
resolution like images of higher quality than the original sample.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
6: 0.06
8: 0.91
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
6: 0.01
5: 0.50
6: 0.44
5: 0.07
6: 0.97
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 1.00
5: 0.00
6: 0.00
5: 0.82
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
6: 0.00
5: 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
6: 0.01
3: 0.79
6: 0.67
3: 0.13
6: 0.99
3: 0.00
6: 1.00
3: 0.00
6: 1.00
3: 0.00
6: 1.00
3: 0.00
6: 1.00
3: 0.00
6: 0.00
3: 1.00
6: 0.00
3: 1.00
6: 0.00
3: 1.00
6: 0.00
3: 1.00
6: 0.00
3: 1.00
6: 0.00
3: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
6: 0.03
8: 0.43
6: 0.87
8: 0.07
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 1.00
8: 0.00
6: 0.00
8: 0.99
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
6: 0.00
8: 1.00
Fig. 21: Visual Counterfactuals on SVHN test samples misclassified by all
methods.
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Original ACET
0 3 0 1 5 1 1 8 0 3 0 1 5 1 1 8
6 2 6 7 1 5 1 6 6 2 6 7 1 5 1 6
0 8 1 9 7 7 5 6 0 8 1 9 7 7 5 6
9 4 3 1 5 7 8 6 9 4 3 1 5 7 8 6
5 1 6 3 3 8 8 7 5 1 6 3 3 8 8 7
3 6 8 1 8 3 8 9 3 6 8 1 8 3 8 9
AT-0.5 AT-0.25
RATIO-0.5 RATIO-0.25
Fig. 22: More Visual Counterfactuals: Random selection of 48 SVHN test
images misclassified by all models (top left shows original images together with
ground truth labels) and the associated visual counterfactuals that are generated
by maximizing the confidence in the ground truth class in a l2 ball of radius 3.
Note that a lot of test images are falsely labeled, i.e. the label either refers to the
digit which is not located in the center of the image or to a completely different
number.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
P
la
in
2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00
O
E
2 - 0.11 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00
A
C
E
T
2 - 0.10 2 - 0.10 2 - 0.10 2 - 0.11 2 - 0.57 2 - 0.98 2 - 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
2 - 0.99 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00 2 - 1.00
R
-0
.5
0
1 - 0.10 1 - 0.10 1 - 0.10 2 - 0.11 2 - 0.11 1 - 0.69 1 - 0.97
R
-0
.2
5
2 - 0.10 2 - 0.10 2 - 0.10 2 - 0.17 2 - 0.84 2 - 0.99 2 - 1.00
Fig. 23: Feature Generation for out-distribution images: Extension of Fig-
ure 7 in the main paper to all models. Only ACET and both RATIO models are
able to generate clearly visible digits, whereas the remaining models make high
confidence predictions in the absence of class specific features.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
5 - 0.10 5 - 0.10 5 - 0.10 5 - 0.10 5 - 0.10 5 - 0.11 5 - 0.11
A
T
-0
.5
0
6 - 0.54 6 - 0.99 6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
4 - 0.60 4 - 0.94 4 - 0.99 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
6 - 0.10 6 - 0.10 6 - 0.10 6 - 0.11 6 - 0.13 6 - 0.24 6 - 0.67
A
C
E
T
5 - 0.10 5 - 0.10 5 - 0.10 5 - 0.10 5 - 0.10 5 - 0.11 5 - 0.11
A
T
-0
.5
0
1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
1 - 0.92 1 - 0.99 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00 1 - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
4 - 0.10 4 - 0.10 4 - 0.10 4 - 0.11 4 - 0.17 4 - 0.68 4 - 0.98
Fig. 24: Feature Generation on OOD images for SVHN models for unseen
images from 80 million tiny images. RATIO0.25 is the only model capable of
generating realistic digits, whereas both AT models make high confidence pre-
dictions in the absence of class-specific features. ACET consistently has low con-
fidences for all budgets as the targeted attack cannot generate with this budget
class-specific features of the predicted target class.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
C
E
T
8 - 0.10 8 - 0.10 8 - 0.10 8 - 0.10 8 - 0.11 8 - 0.11 8 - 0.11
A
T
-0
.5
0
6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00 6 - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
8 - 0.58 8 - 0.99 8 - 1.00 8 - 1.00 8 - 1.00 8 - 1.00 8 - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
6 - 0.10 6 - 0.10 6 - 0.10 6 - 0.12 6 - 0.21 6 - 0.47 6 - 0.83
A
C
E
T
2 - 0.10 2 - 0.10 2 - 0.10 2 - 0.10 2 - 0.85 2 - 0.99 2 - 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0
4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
4 - 0.10 4 - 0.11 4 - 0.15 4 - 0.40 4 - 0.96 4 - 1.00 4 - 1.00
Fig. 25: Feature Generation on OOD images for SVHN models for unseen
images from 80 million tiny images. RATIO0.25 generates the best digits and has
low confidence on the initial images and the less images with lower radii which
do not show yet class-specific features.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
T
-0
.5
0
tulip: 0.02
rose: 0.83
tulip: 0.07
rose: 0.68
tulip: 0.29
rose: 0.46
tulip: 0.76
rose: 0.14
tulip: 0.98
rose: 0.01
tulip: 1.00
rose: 0.00
tulip: 1.00
rose: 0.00
tulip: 0.01
rose: 0.95
tulip: 0.00
rose: 0.99
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
tulip: 0.02
rose: 0.78
tulip: 0.17
rose: 0.50
tulip: 0.77
rose: 0.11
tulip: 0.99
rose: 0.01
tulip: 1.00
rose: 0.00
tulip: 1.00
rose: 0.00
tulip: 1.00
rose: 0.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 0.98
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.5
0
tulip: 0.03
rose: 0.81
tulip: 0.09
rose: 0.62
tulip: 0.32
rose: 0.39
tulip: 0.76
rose: 0.12
tulip: 0.97
rose: 0.01
tulip: 1.00
rose: 0.00
tulip: 1.00
rose: 0.00
tulip: 0.01
rose: 0.93
tulip: 0.01
rose: 0.97
tulip: 0.00
rose: 0.99
tulip: 0.00
rose: 0.99
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
tulip: 0.01
rose: 0.86
tulip: 0.02
rose: 0.65
tulip: 0.52
rose: 0.27
tulip: 0.96
rose: 0.00
tulip: 0.99
rose: 0.00
tulip: 1.00
rose: 0.00
tulip: 1.00
rose: 0.00
tulip: 0.00
rose: 0.94
tulip: 0.00
rose: 0.97
tulip: 0.00
rose: 0.98
tulip: 0.00
rose: 0.99
tulip: 0.00
rose: 0.99
tulip: 0.00
rose: 1.00
Fig. 26: Visual Counterfactuals on CIFAR100 test samples misclassified by
all methods. While all models are able to generate class specific features, even
for similar classes, the RATIO generated images show less distortions and overall
higher image quality.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
T
-0
.5
0
hamster: 0.01
mouse: 0.75
hamster: 0.12
mouse: 0.68
hamster: 0.54
mouse: 0.36
hamster: 0.94
mouse: 0.04
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 0.01
mouse: 0.94
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 0.99
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
hamster: 0.01
mouse: 0.90
hamster: 0.21
mouse: 0.68
hamster: 0.85
mouse: 0.12
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 0.99
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.5
0
hamster: 0.03
mouse: 0.70
hamster: 0.22
mouse: 0.57
hamster: 0.71
mouse: 0.23
hamster: 0.96
mouse: 0.04
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 0.02
mouse: 0.90
hamster: 0.01
mouse: 0.96
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 0.99
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 0.99
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
hamster: 0.04
mouse: 0.86
hamster: 0.64
mouse: 0.23
hamster: 0.96
mouse: 0.03
hamster: 0.99
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 1.00
mouse: 0.00
hamster: 0.01
mouse: 0.98
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 0.99
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
hamster: 0.00
mouse: 1.00
Fig. 27: Visual Counterfactuals on CIFAR100 test samples misclassified by
all methods. While all models are able to generate class specific features, even
for similar classes, the RATIO generated images show less distortions and overall
higher image quality.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
T
-0
.5
0
turtle: 0.00
snail: 0.58
turtle: 0.00
snail: 0.55
turtle: 0.08
snail: 0.51
turtle: 0.62
snail: 0.19
turtle: 0.96
snail: 0.02
turtle: 1.00
snail: 0.00
turtle: 1.00
snail: 0.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 0.96
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
turtle: 0.00
snail: 0.69
turtle: 0.03
snail: 0.60
turtle: 0.53
snail: 0.28
turtle: 0.97
snail: 0.02
turtle: 1.00
snail: 0.00
turtle: 1.00
snail: 0.00
turtle: 1.00
snail: 0.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.5
0
turtle: 0.00
snail: 0.90
turtle: 0.00
snail: 0.66
turtle: 0.02
snail: 0.68
turtle: 0.14
snail: 0.57
turtle: 0.74
snail: 0.15
turtle: 0.98
snail: 0.01
turtle: 1.00
snail: 0.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-0
.2
5
turtle: 0.00
snail: 0.82
turtle: 0.01
snail: 0.51
turtle: 0.42
snail: 0.27
turtle: 0.96
snail: 0.01
turtle: 1.00
snail: 0.00
turtle: 1.00
snail: 0.00
turtle: 1.00
snail: 0.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 0.99
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
turtle: 0.00
snail: 1.00
Fig. 28: Visual Counterfactuals on CIFAR100 test samples misclassified by
all methods. The two RATIO models are able to generate higher quality images
for both the ground truth and falsely predicted class.
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Original Plain
telephone bus forest oak girl caterpillar man palm telephone bus forest oak girl caterpillar man palm
camel beaver beaver house oak beaver couch beaver camel beaver beaver house oak beaver couch beaver
house raccoon bowl cloud table girl table bed house raccoon bowl cloud table girl table bed
kangaroo possum girl lamp bowl snake turtle snail kangaroo possum girl lamp bowl snake turtle snail
man willow woman cattle lobster seal seal bus man willow woman cattle lobster seal seal bus
boy tulip bee mushroom hamster seal otter kangaroo boy tulip bee mushroom hamster seal otter kangaroo
AT-0.5 AT-0.25
RATIO-0.5 RATIO-0.25
Fig. 29: Random selection of 48 images from the CIFAR100 test set which are
misclassified by all our models and the associated visual counterfactuals that
are generated by maximizing the confidence in the gt-class in a l2 ball of radius
3. The numbers over the individual images indicate the target class and were
omitted for the latter models.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
T
-0
.5
0 cockroach - 0.26 cockroach - 0.60 cockroach - 0.89 cockroach - 0.98 cockroach - 1.00 cockroach - 1.00 cockroach - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
bottle - 0.34 bottle - 0.89 bottle - 1.00 bottle - 1.00 bottle - 1.00 bottle - 1.00 bottle - 1.00
R
-0
.5
0
cockroach - 0.06 cockroach - 0.11 cockroach - 0.23 cockroach - 0.55 cockroach - 0.82 cockroach - 0.97 cockroach - 0.99
R
-0
.2
5
bottle - 0.03 bottle - 0.07 bottle - 0.19 bottle - 0.52 bottle - 0.79 bottle - 0.93 bottle - 0.97
A
T
-0
.5
0
lizard - 0.40 lizard - 0.86 lizard - 0.98 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
snake - 0.28 snake - 0.95 snake - 1.00 snake - 1.00 snake - 1.00 snake - 1.00 snake - 1.00
R
-0
.5
0
lizard - 0.74 lizard - 0.94 lizard - 0.98 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
lizard - 0.43 lizard - 0.95 lizard - 0.98 lizard - 0.99 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00 lizard - 1.00
Fig. 30: Feature Generation on OOD images (CIFAR100) for models for
unseen images from 80 million tiny images. The two RATIO models are able to
create less distorted images than the simple adversarially trained models.
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Model Orig.  = 0.5  = 1.0  = 1.5  = 2.0  = 2.5  = 3.0
A
T
-0
.5
0
table - 0.89 table - 0.99 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
table - 0.99 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00
R
-0
.5
0
table - 0.84 table - 0.97 table - 0.99 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00
R
-0
.2
5
table - 0.85 table - 0.96 table - 0.98 table - 0.99 table - 1.00 table - 1.00 table - 1.00
A
T
-0
.5
0 bridge - 0.20 bridge - 0.60 bridge - 0.90 bridge - 0.98 bridge - 1.00 bridge - 1.00 bridge - 1.00
A
T
-0
.2
5
chair - 0.35 chair - 0.84 chair - 0.99 chair - 1.00 chair - 1.00 chair - 1.00 chair - 1.00
R
-0
.5
0
train - 0.01 train - 0.02 train - 0.03 train - 0.09 train - 0.31 train - 0.70 train - 0.89
R
-0
.2
5
clock - 0.01 clock - 0.02 clock - 0.04 clock - 0.18 clock - 0.55 clock - 0.84 clock - 0.94
Fig. 31: Feature Generation on OOD images (CIFAR100) for models for
unseen images from 80 million tiny images. The two RATIO models are able to
create less distorted images than the simple adversarially trained models.
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Model Orig.  = 3.5  = 7.0  = 10.5  = 14.0  = 17.5  = 21.0
M
a
d
ry
A
T
-3
.5
0
Crab: 0.14
Turtle: 0.63
Crab: 0.52
Turtle: 0.24
Crab: 0.89
Turtle: 0.04
Crab: 0.99
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 0.03
Turtle: 0.92
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 0.99
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
A
T
-3
.5
0
Crab: 0.11
Turtle: 0.63
Crab: 0.60
Turtle: 0.19
Crab: 0.97
Turtle: 0.01
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 0.01
Turtle: 0.96
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-3
.5
0
Crab: 0.02
Turtle: 0.95
Crab: 0.44
Turtle: 0.50
Crab: 0.98
Turtle: 0.01
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 0.99
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-1
.7
5
Crab: 0.02
Turtle: 0.92
Crab: 0.89
Turtle: 0.06
Crab: 0.99
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 1.00
Turtle: 0.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 0.99
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Crab: 0.00
Turtle: 1.00
Fig. 32: Visual Counterfactuals on restricted ImageNet test samples misclas-
sified by all methods. The visual counterfactuals of all AT and RATIO models
are comparable in terms of quality.
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Model Orig.  = 3.5  = 7.0  = 10.5  = 14.0  = 17.5  = 21.0
M
a
d
ry
A
T
-3
.5
0
Monkey: 0.11
Insect: 0.49
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Fig. 33: Visual Counterfactuals on restricted ImageNet test samples misclas-
sified by all methods. The quality of adversarial training and RATIO is quite
similar. The change to dog is quite subtle but reasonable both for RATIO3.5 and
AT3.5.
56 M. Augustin, A. Meinke, M. Hein
Model Orig.  = 3.5  = 7.0  = 10.5  = 14.0  = 17.5  = 21.0
M
a
d
ry
A
T
-3
.5
0
Insect: 0.01
Dog: 0.97
Insect: 0.27
Dog: 0.69
Insect: 0.99
Dog: 0.01
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
A
T
-3
.5
0
Insect: 0.02
Dog: 0.84
Insect: 0.88
Dog: 0.08
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 0.96
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-3
.5
0
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 0.99
Insect: 0.96
Dog: 0.02
Insect: 0.99
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
R
A
T
IO
-1
.7
5
Insect: 0.01
Dog: 0.98
Insect: 0.98
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 0.99
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 1.00
Dog: 0.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Insect: 0.00
Dog: 1.00
Fig. 34: Visual Counterfactuals on restricted ImageNet test samples misclas-
sified by all methods. The quality of AT and RATIO is quite similar.
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Original Madry
Monkey Fish Crab Turtle Bird Monkey Fish Crab Turtle Bird
Fish Monkey Bird Bird Turtle Fish Monkey Bird Bird Turtle
Insect Frog Fish Fish Cat Insect Frog Fish Fish Cat
Crab Fish Cat Monkey Bird Crab Fish Cat Monkey Bird
AT-3.5 AT-1.75
RATIO-3.5 RATIO-1.75
Fig. 35: Random selection of 20 images from the restricted ImageNet test set
which are misclassified by all our models and the associated visual counterfac-
tuals that are generated by maximizing the confidence in the gt-class in a l2 ball
of radius 21. The numbers over the individual images indicate the target class
and were omitted for the latter models.
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Fig. 36: Feature Generation on OOD images (restricted ImageNet) for
images from the remaining classes of ImageNet. In both panels the AT models
are overconfident on the OOD images and produce too fast high confidence
predictions even though class specific features are not present yet. The RATIO
models show high confidence only when class-specific features have appeared.
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Fig. 37: Feature Generation on OOD images (restricted ImageNet) for
images from the remaining classes of ImageNet. In both panels the AT models
are overconfident on the OOD images and produce high confidence predictions
too fast even though class specific features are not present yet. The RATIO
models show high confidence only when class-specific features have appeared.
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Fig. 38: Visual Counterfactual - Failure Case for CIFAR10: For certain
images visual counterfactuals yield little insight for the human observer even
though the model confidences flip from 0 to 1. For CIFAR10, especially the
“car” and “truck” classes are hard to distinguish for all models.
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Fig. 39: Feature Generation on OOD images - Failure Case CIFAR10:
While RATIO is able to generate high-quality samples for comparatively small
radii of 1.0 or larger, the initial confidence is too high as no class features are
visible.
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Fig. 40: Feature Generation on OOD images - Failure Case CIFAR10:
RATIO correctly assigns a low confidence to the given out-distribution samples
(in contrast to JEM-0 and AT0.5) but the confidence increases to 1.0 without
the appearance of interpretable features.
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Fig. 41: Visual Counterfactual - Failure Case for SVHN: On few SVHN
test set examples, neither of the models is able to generate proper digits but the
predicted confidence rises even for small radii without the appearance of class
specific features. Note that RATIO is the only model able to generate meaningful
features for larger radii, e.g. the bow of the 2.
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Fig. 42: Feature Generation on OOD images - Failure Case SVHN:
On some OOD samples, the radius of the threat model is not large enough to
produce proper digits. However ACET and RATIO are the only models assigning
low confidences to the  = 3 samples.
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Fig. 43: Feature Generation on OOD images - Failure Case SVHN: On
this OOD sample, all models assign very high confidence to the final image even
though all but the ACET images clearly lack strong digit-like features.
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Fig. 44: Visual Counterfactual - Failure Case for CIFAR100: Especially
for images from the classes ”girl”, ”woman”, ”boy” and ”man”, visual coun-
terfactuals often yield little insight into the model behaviour as they introduce
meaningless distortions.
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Fig. 45: Feature Generation on OOD images - Failure Case CIFAR100:
The 80M Tiny Images dataset contains a lot of images depicting humans. In a
lot of cases, the model distorts the images and creates a strong uncanny valley-
feeling.
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Fig. 46: Feature Generation on OOD images - Failure Case CIFAR100:
The image quality often is dependent on the highest scoring class in the original
OD-image. While R-0.25 transforms the painting into three bottles, there are
hardly any squirrel features visible for R-0.50 and AT-0.50, even though the
confidence reaches 1.0.
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Fig. 47: Visual Counterfactuals - Failure Case for r. ImageNet: Unusual
object locations lead to multiple overlaying counterfactuals which do not lead to
meaningful natural images.
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-3
.5
0
Dog - 0.79 Dog - 0.97 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00
A
T
-3
.5
0
Dog - 0.86 Dog - 0.97 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00
R
-3
.5
0
Monkey - 0.13 Monkey - 0.16 Monkey - 0.23 Monkey - 0.33 Monkey - 0.44 Monkey - 0.53 Monkey - 0.66
R
-1
.7
5
Dog - 0.13 Dog - 0.17 Dog - 0.38 Dog - 0.56 Dog - 0.80 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00
Fig. 48: Feature Generation on OOD images - Failure Case r. ImageNet:
Overly confident predictions even though little class-specific features have ap-
peared.
M
.
A
T
-3
.5
0
Dog - 0.37 Dog - 0.74 Dog - 0.98 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00 Dog - 1.00
A
T
-3
.5
0
Monkey - 0.30 Monkey - 0.70 Monkey - 1.00 Monkey - 1.00 Monkey - 1.00 Monkey - 1.00 Monkey - 1.00
R
-3
.5
0
Fish - 0.58 Fish - 0.91 Fish - 0.99 Fish - 1.00 Fish - 1.00 Fish - 1.00 Fish - 1.00
R
-1
.7
5
Fish - 0.64 Fish - 0.94 Fish - 0.99 Fish - 1.00 Fish - 1.00 Fish - 1.00 Fish - 1.00
Fig. 49: Feature Generation on OOD images - Failure Case r. ImageNet:
For the RATIO models which have target fish a human appears as fish training
images often show the angler together with the haul.
